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ABSTRACT
With one of the largest available collection of reusable packages, the
JavaScript runtime environment Node.js is one of the most popular
programming application. With recent work showing evidence
that known vulnerabilities are prevalent in both open source and
industrial software, we propose and implement a viable code-based
vulnerability detection tool for Node.js applications. Our case study
lists the challenges encountered while implementing our Node.js
vulnerable code detector.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As of 2020, the Node.js package manager (i.e., npm) is reported to
serve over 1.3 million packages to roughly 12 million developers,
who download such packages 75 billion times a month, and all at
a growing rate [19]. Furthermore, as evidence of its influence, the
industry giant Microsoft’s GitHub had completed its acquisition of
npm earlier in April, 2020. Recent studies have shown evidence that
known vulnerabilities can affect both open source and industrial
applications alike [24].
Most detection methods for vulnerabilities has been at meta-
detection [7, 17]. Meta-detection capabilities rely on the assump-
tion that the metadata associated to Open Source Software (OSS)
libraries (e.g., name, version), and to vulnerability descriptions (e.g.,
technical details, list of affected components) are always available
and accurate. The metadata, which are used to map each library
onto a list of known vulnerabilities that affect it, are often incom-
plete, inconsistent, or missing altogether. Existing works show that
such approaches are unreliable and suffer from false positives [28].
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Ponta et al. [21, 22] proposed Eclipse-Steady, a code-centric and
usage-based approach to detect open source vulnerabilities. The
Eclipse-Steady project [6] is able to identify, assess and mitigate
open source dependencies with known vulnerabilities for Java and
Python industry grade applications. It supports software devel-
opment organizations in regard to the secure use of open source
components during application development. A code-centric ap-
proach reduces the number of false positives and false negatives
as it accounts for the actual presence of vulnerable constructs (i.e.,
constructs that are modified by the patch), no matter where they
occur [21, 22]. Having identified the vulnerable constructs, it is
then possible to establish whether they are reachable in the con-
text of an application thereby assessing the potential impact of the
vulnerability.
Although most studies use meta-detection (i.e., checking the
package.json configuration file) for mapping npm vulnerabilities to
the packages, there is yet to be a code-centric approach designed
for JavaScript Node.js applications [4, 5, 10, 29]. Lauinger et al. [11]
provides evidence that JavaScript issues are prevalent in most web
applications, strengthening the argument for a Node.js code-centric
solution. Due to the dynamic event-based nature of JavaScript code,
the performance of a code-centric approach is unknown.
To address this gap, in this paper we present an experience
report on a code-centric approach to detect open source vulner-
abilities using bill of materials to determine whether vulnerable
code is repackaged within Node.js applications. First, we discuss the
challenges associated with the construction of bill of materials of
Node.js applications. We then propose our solution to counter these
challenges. To evaluate our approach, we perform a case study on
65 Node.js applications under development at SAP. Preliminary
results show that our method is viable, with vulnerable code from
five vulnerabilities being detected in 18 applications under develop-
ment. The study highlights three lessons learned and the challenges
that require attention by both researchers and practitioners dealing
with Node.js applications and JavaScript in general.
2 PERILS OF JAVASCRIPT NODE.JS ANALYSIS
Analysis of JavaScript code is not trivial, as server-side Node.js
applications (including npm packages) involve sockets, streams, and
files performed in an asynchronous manner, where the execution of
listeners is triggered by events [13]. The challenge for such dynamic
code is the proper identification of a function call, which has been
the issue for static analysis tools [3, 23]. Moreover, JavaScript allows
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Table 1: Defined List of Constructs in hierarchical chain for Node.js Applications. This is based on Figure 1 and Listing 1
Construct Type Description Fully Qualified Name
Package (PACK) Package and Directory name ProjectA
Module (MODU) File name ProjectA.utils.util_b
Function (FUNC) Function name with arguments ProjectA.utils.util_b.buy(item)
Class (CLAS) Class name with extended class ProjectA.utils.util_b.Car()
Method (METH) Method name with arguments ProjectA.utils.util_b.Car().drive(distance,direction)
Constructor (CONS) Constructor name with arguments ProjectA.utils.util_b.Car().constructor(name,age)
Object (OBJT) Object name ProjectA.utils.util_b.item_list
anonymous functions, i.e., functions without a name [25]. To avoid
this complexity of the reachability analysis, our approach is based
on the detection of vulnerable code.
We reuse the approach proposed by Ponta et al. [21, 22], where
a vulnerability is detected whenever an application dependency
contains program constructs (such as methods) that were modi-
fied, added, or deleted to fix that vulnerability. We extend Eclipse-
Steady to support the analysis of JavaScript code [14]. In particular,
we add the ability to construct the list of program constructs modi-
fied to fix JavaScript vulnerabilities, as well as the list of program
constructs which are part of a JavaScript application and dependen-
cies (its bill of materials).
3 BILL OF MATERIALS FOR NODE.JS
When compared to the classical model (i.e., Java or C++), JavaScript
does not provide a true class implementation. Instead, it has only the
object construct with its private property (i.e., prototype) to imitate
the constructs from the classical model [27]. A program construct
is defined as a set of structural elements with a language, a type,
and a unique fully-qualified name identifier as defined in Ponta
et al. [21, 22].
3.1 Constructs for a Node.js application
1 class Car {
2 constructor(name , age) { ...
3 }
4 drive(distance , direction) { ...
5 }
6 }
7 var item_list = { ...
8 }
9 function buy(item) { ...
10 }
Listing 1: Example of a class of util_b.js
Figure 1 illustrates a hierarchical structure of a Node.js project,
which will be used as our running example. Complementary, List-
ing 1 shows a code snippet from the JavaScript file util_b.js of
Figure 1. We use these running examples to explain our proposed
constructs.
Table 1 shows a summary of the seven construct types we use
for Node.js applications. We now explain each construct in detail.
The PACK construct represents an application scope and its internal
directories e.g., ProjectA, /utils. The MODU construct represents a
JavaScript file in an application e.g., util_a.js. The FUNC construct
represents a function declaration in a MODU e.g., buy(item). The
CLAS construct represents a class declaration in a MODU e.g., Car().
/ProjectA
/utils
util_a.js util_b.js
index.js package.json README.md
/node_modules
/ms
/moment
/debug
/src/node.js Vulnerable construct in debug:
debug.src.node.exports.formatters.o(v)
Figure 1: Running example of the Node.js project with its
hierarchical structure.
The METH construct represents a method declaration in a CLAS e.g.,
drive(distance, direction). The CONS construct represents a
constructor declaration in a CLAS e.g., constructor(name, age).
The OBJT construct represents an object in a MODU e.g., item_list.
As shown in Table 1, we use the PACK construct (i.e., ProjectA)
hierarchy to form our fully qualified name. Since JavaScript does
allow for anonymous functions, classes, or objects, we use the (LoC)
position for the fully-qualified name of anonymous constructs.
3.2 Dependency Constructs and their Features
The program constructs defined in Section 3 are also used to ob-
tain the bill of materials of the third-party dependencies that are
contained within the application (i.e., npm package). Following our
running example in Figure 1, we use the package.json configu-
ration file and the nodes_modules directory. In our example, the
vulnerable construct is in the debug package at the OBJT level (i.e.,
debug.src.node.exports.formatters.o(v))
1 ...
2 },
3 "dependencies": {
4 "moment": "2.25.3"
5 },
6 "devDependencies": {
7 "debug": "3.0.0"
8 },
9 ...
Listing 2: Dependency snippet from package.json
Listing 2 shows that our example ProjectA depends on the pack-
ages debug and moment. On top of collecting the bill of materials
of each dependency, we analyze them according to two features.
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The first is related to whether or not the dependency will be used
in production. There are two types of dependencies. Runtime de-
pendencies (i.e., moment package ) are those intended to be used in
production. Test dependencies (i.e., debug package) are intended
as development-only packages, unneeded in production.
1 ProjectA@1 .0.0 /ProjectA
2 |--- debug@4 .1.1
3 | |--- ms@2 .1.2
4 |--- moment@2 .25.3
Listing 3: Dependency tree of ProjectA
The second feature is the dependency tree depth. Listing 3 shows
the dependency tree that depicts the relationships among the pack-
ages debug, moments and ms. There are two types of dependencies:
direct and transitive. Direct dependencies are directly required by
the application. As shown in the example, the packages debug and
moment are direct dependencies and are listed in the package.json
file. Transitive dependencies are not directly required by the appli-
cation but are required by its dependencies. As shown in Listing 3,
the ms package is a transitive package required by debug.
4 CASE STUDY OF NODE.JS APPLICATIONS
To evaluate our proposed constructs, we conducted an assessment
of vulnerable code from under-development projects at SAP.
4.1 Experiment Design
The experiment consisted of the detection of a set of known open
source vulnerabilities against a set of industrial applications. Note
that our experiment was conducted in September, 2019.
Bill of materials extraction. We create a bill of materials
(BOM) which consists of construct lists of the application and its
dependencies (i.e., both direct and transitive). To do this, we use
ANTLR-v4 with a JavaScript grammar [1] to model and extract
the Node.js application source code. This grammar is able to par-
tially extract JavaScript with ES6 features at the beginning of our
development (July 24, 2019).
To obtain the BOM from an application, we first download the ap-
plication dependencies by using npm install. We then explore and
build the dependency tree by looking at the package-lock.json
file. After that, we use ANTLR-v4 to extract the list of constructs
from the JavaScript files of the application. Next, we traverse the
dependency tree depth-first to extract the list of constructs from
each dependency.
Table 2: Experimental Dataset
OSS npm package vulnerabilities
number of vulnerabilities 60
number of vulnerable package 24
number of valid vulnerabilities 32
number of valid vulnerable package 15
Industrial Node.js applications
number of applications 65
number of valid application 42
Vulnerability knowledge base. We build our own Node.js vul-
nerability dataset which includes the vulnerability information and
its fix for Eclipse-Steady. We first retrieve the list of Node.js vul-
nerabilities and their information from the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) [2]. We selected only vulnerabilities that have
fixes and affect the top-100 most depended npm packages [18].
We then manually annotate the set of commits that correspond
to the vulnerability fix. The set of commits has to be confirmed
as it appeared on the master branch of the library git repository.
Given the fix commit(s) for a vulnerability, we use our extension of
Eclipse-Steady to determine the changes that were applied to the
code by the fix commit. As shown in Table 2, we end up with 60
vulnerabilities in our study.
SAP Node.js Applications. We used SAP GitHub enterprise
to identify Node.js applications suitable for our case study. We
considered only applications under development having the
package.json file in their root directory. We selected a sample
of 65 applications, as shown in Table 2.
Table 3: Dependency Type information.
# Dependencies Median Min Max Q1 Q3 SD
# All Dep. 464.5 3 1,226 229.75 748.5 339.55
# Runtime Dep. 108.5 0 586 40.75 193 146.18
# Test Dep. 257 0 1,067 117.25 561.5 335.31
Table 3 shows the distribution of dependencies, showing more
than a hundred dependencies in each application by median (i.e.
464.5 dependencies) with some applications having up to a thousand
dependencies (i.e., 1,226 dependencies). We observe that the number
of test dependencies is bigger than the one of runtime dependencies
by two times (i.e., 257 > 108.5).
4.2 Results
We present our results in terms of: (i) detected vulnerabilities, and
(ii) dependency constructs.
Detected Vulnerabilities. Our prototype was able to detect five
vulnerabilities that affected the lodash and debug npm packages.
Lodash [12] is "A modern JavaScript utility library delivering mod-
ularity, performance, and extras". According to the npmjs website
[16], lodash is a very popular package, with over 27,500,000 weekly
downloads and 114,917 other packages that are dependent on this
package. Debug [26] is "A tiny JavaScript debugging utility mod-
elled after Node.js core’s debugging technique". According to the
npmjs website [15], debug is also considered a popular package,
with over 66,800,000 weekly downloads and 34,494 dependents.
Dependency Constructs and features. In our case study, our
extension to Eclipse-Steady could analyze 42 out of 65 applications.
Table 4 shows the distribution of the BOM extracted from the
applications. Our prototypewas able to extract more than a hundred
constructs from an application and its dependencies (i.e., 164.5
constructs). In more detail, the number of application constructs is
bigger than the one of dependency constructs by three times (i.e.,
75 > 26).
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Table 4: Summary of Construct Information from the exper-
iment.
# Constructs Median Min Max Q1 Q3 SD
# App Consts. 75 0 3,083 28.25 167.5 573.99
# Dep Consts. 26 0 9,549 1.25 114.25 2,144.69
# App + Dep Consts. 164.5 1 9,671 83.25 609.75 2,224.14
Table 5: Frequency count of Dependent Construct Changes
per vulnerability
CVE Construct Change Type
Added Modified Removed
CVE-2017-16137 FUNC:1 MODU:1, FUNC:1
CVE-2018-3721 FUNC:2, OBJT:1 MODU:2, FUNC:7
CVE-2018-16487 FUNC:2, OBJT:4 MODU:2, FUNC:4 FUNC:1
CVE-2019-10744 FUNC:1, OBJT:3 MODU:2, FUNC:5
CVE-2019-1010266 FUNC:1 MODU:2, FUNC:3
Table 6: Frequency distribution of Dependency Constructs
based on the dependency features.
Vulnerability Runtime (26) Test (31)
Direct Trans. Direct Trans.
CVE-2017-16137 0 1 0 11
CVE-2018-3721 0 6 1 2
CVE-2018-16487 0 6 1 3
CVE-2019-10744 0 7 1 8
CVE-2019-1010266 0 6 1 3
0 26 4 27
Table 5 and Table 6 show the affected dependency constructs
and their construct type. Table 5 shows that the construct changes
were detected at the OBJT, MODU and FUNC level. We observe that the
majority of the vulnerable dependencies are transitive (28 runtime
dependencies and 27 test dependencies), i.e., usually out of the
control of the application developer. We also observe that most of
the vulnerable constructs are detected in test dependencies.
5 EXPERIENCE REPORT
Our results indicate that a Node.js vulnerable code detector is viable.
We now report three lessons learned and their potential future
roadmap.
5.1 Mapping JavaScript Object to Constructs
In our approach, we defined a more classical inheritance of con-
structs (like Java and C++) on top of the JavaScript prototypal
inheritance model. With this choice, one of the main issues is to
ensure that we capture all the different ways to create objects and
their constructs. For instance, there are at least six way to declare a
function in JavaScript [20]. Furthermore, it is still an open question
whether the implementation efforts required to extract the finer-
level constructs (e.g., OBJT) are worth. As shown in Table 5, in most
of the cases the MODU constructs were sufficient for the detection of
the vulnerabilities.
Potential future avenues are two-fold. First, we would like to
consider all the ways in which objects can be created in JavaScript.
Second, we intend to evaluate the detection capabilities of our
approach at different levels of the construct hierarchy (i.e., MODU
vs. FUNC vs. OBJT).
5.2 Node.js application reliance on the npm
ecosystem
The applications in our case study rely on npm packages, and as
such, are potentially prone to attacks targeting popular packages,
like the lodash and debug packages. Since the npm ecosystem
is considered one of the biggest and most popular, it does also
suffer the most in terms of known vulnerabilities, with the GitHub
Advisory Database reporting npm as having the highest number of
vulnerabilities (i.e., 681) when compared to six other ecosystems [8].
With the GitHub acquisition of npm, we envisage that Node.js
applications will need to be aware of changes within the npm
ecosystem. The creation and evaluation of such reporting mecha-
nisms are seen a future work.
5.3 Faster Technology Adoption
Officially known as ECMAScript, the JavaScript language has been
in constant evolution with its technology, with new specifications
released every year. In response, Node.js keeps up to date [9]. Since
industrial projects struggle with migration due to various migra-
tion or compatibility issue, it is a struggle for applications to keep
up with the Node.js technology. For example, practitioners would
like to control or specify the supported platform of the language.
As mentioned in Section 5.2, the usage of npm packages requires
industrial applications to keep up with the npm ecosystem evolu-
tion. Like most tools, we find that JavaScript static tools (such as
ANTLRv4) struggle to keep up to date.
Potential future avenues for both researchers and practitioners
should include strategies that help application developers to prop-
erly manage backward compatibility or guidelines to keep up with
the ever-evolving technology.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present an experience report on the implementa-
tion of a code-centric vulnerability detection tool for open source
dependencies of Node.js applications. Using extracted constructs,
we show that a code-centric detection tool is viable, although there
are challenges related to the JavaScript language and the complexity
of the application dependencies.
Future work would be to tackle the challenges of JavaScript anal-
ysis, or extending the tool to analyze the reachability of vulnerable
constructs using static and dynamic analysis techniques. We believe
that our results and experience is not only useful for the Eclipse-
Steady project, but also in regards to the overall analysis of Node.js
applications and their npm packages.
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